Manvers Main Mr. Shawcross put in a form of report sheet headed "Isolation of Face Machinery Report" and gave directions as follows:-“This sheet is to be completed whenever face machinery is left unattended as at weekends or holidays or play days. It must be filled in by the deputies in charge of the last working shifts.” The report was as follows:- “I have personally seen that the compressed air hoses or electric trailing cables are completely disconnected from ALL gate conveyors, face conveyors, coal cutters, rotary boring machines and all other face machinery.” This had to be signed and dated by the deputies and countersigned by the manager and undermanager. Deputy Wroe had signed such a report for his Saturday afternoon shift even though the Joy loader trailing cable had not been completely disconnected at the gate end box. Harry Ayscough was the deputy on duty on the night shift of Saturday 3rd March. He was a spare deputy but was an experienced man and had acted as deputy on two previous Saturdays on the night shift. At the inquiry he gave a full and detailed statement of the events leading up to the explosion. Instead of going down the pit at 10p.m. to make his pre-shift inspection he descended the No.4 shaft at midnight accompanied by a shift of nine workmen, four of whom were to cut the 8B North face, four to move conveyor pans in the bottom level of the North-West and one, Charles Edward Leeman, to attend to the pumps of which there were three, two driven by compressed air in the headings of the dip of the North Plane and one, electrically driven at the side of the North Plane outbye of the transformer station. The former delivered into a standage near the latter from which the main pump delivered the water to the shaft bottom. The electric power was off, but as it was required for cutting on 8B face and for driving the two auxiliary fans, the deputy switched it on as he went in. The men at work on the 8B face carried electric lamps and had no safety lamp or other detector with them as they ought to have had. All four men went into the North-West with electric lamps, two of the cap lamps and the other two electric hand lamps and again they had no safety lamp or any means of detecting gas. Leeman carried both an electric lamp and a safety lamp but this was found at the main pump house in the North Plane after the explosion. The deputy proceeded down the North Plane taking with him the four men who were to work in the North-West and left them at the bottom while he went in and examined the workings. He returned and the men followed him down the plane and the four who were to work at 8B face proceeded to the bottom of 8’s loader belt where they waited for him. They then followed him in while he inspected the place of work. The inquiry pointed out that in doing this the requirements of Section 63 of the Coal Mines Act,1911 and the General Regulation 50 were not observed. Ayscough said he expected the pump man to go into the first pump house down the plane, look at the sump there and then go to the second pump house and inspect the sump and if this was full, to start pumping, or if it was not, to go down to his air pump. After leaving the bottom of the North Plane Ayscough went to the North-West by the top level as far as the 12th slit, then down the 7’s heading in the middle cross slit and out along the bottom level to the 1st slit and back to where the four men were waiting for him. He did not go into the face of the headings as he did not think this necessary since no one was to work there on that shift. He tested for gas against the fan as he went in since that was the highest point and he thought that gas was most likely to be there. He found none and started the fan by putting in the isolation switch and then pressing the start button. The fan was thestarted after having been stopped for seven hours without an inspection of the district having been made. He made further tests for gas in 7’s heading by the first cross slit and at the junction of 6’s heading with the bottom level and found no gas. At about 12.30 a.m. he started his inspection of the North-West and he estimated that from leaving the men at the bottom of the North Plane until rejoining them would take about 15 minutes and no more than twenty. From the distance that he had to travel, it was evident that his examination must have been very hurried and there was doubt that he did in fact test for gas except at the fan. On returning to the four men at the North Plane, he sent them to their work and did not see them or Leeman alive again. After inspecting the workings on the other side of the plane and finding everything was in order, he admitted the men and then he went to the pit bottom where he saw Ernest Briggs, the onsetter. He left the pit bottom about 2.35 a.m. to make his second inspection and went inbye by the return as far as the belt conveyor, then through the separation doors at 6th North on to the North Plane and down to the Plane bottom. As soon as he saw the main belt there he realised that something was wrong because the belt was covered with a thin film of dust. There was haze in the intake and dust was showing in the beam of his lamp. His first impression was that there had been a heavy fall. The time was about 3 a.m. He went along the North-West top level to the 5th slit and went down into the bottom level to get to the men but on reaching with two yards of the 4’s heading, the air was thick with dust and he could just see that there had been a fall on the chain conveyor. He adjusted his lamp to make a test for gas but breathing had become very difficult and he did not stay. He retreated by the 5th slit to where he apparently switched off the current to the fan and went along and to five yards beyond the slit where he found 1 to 2 percent firedamp and three yards further up he found 4 percent. He now knew what he needed assistance and started to come out but stumbled and fell and after crawling for about twenty yards he lost consciousness for some time. When he came to he found his lamp at his side, still burning and travelled outbye to the plane bottom where he was forced to sit down and rest. After some consideration he decided to go to 8B face and get those men out. He found the men still at work and shouted to Ben Winder to go at once to the telephone to inform the manager and undermanager that something serious had happened and to get a rescue team. He told the other three men to go out by the return and asked them to assist him. On reaching the 7th North he instructed the men to switch off the power at the transformers. When they got to the main plane he sent Jack Winder up to the pump house to see if Leeman was there. Winder could not find Leeman and Ayscough concluded that he was also missing but he had no idea where he was. Ayscough arrived at the telephone and spoke to the undermanager who asked him to go in there turn at the 5th North and test the ventilation there. He did so but could find no firedamp but there was a strong smell in the return. After reporting to Mr. Wild what he had found, he enquired the time and was told it was 5 a.m. He then decided to go in again along the top level, taking Jack Winder with him. They got to within two yards of the 6th slit where he found that the dust had cleared a lot, and he saw that the junction had fallen in at the gear head. Testing for gas he found 4 percent and considered it too dangerous to make further attempts to go on. They returned to the pit bottom where Briggs was instructed to cut off all the power in the pit. The inquiry was very aware of Ayscough’s brave conduct. Ben Winder gave evidence at the inquiry and said that as far as he could estimate, for he did not have a watch, it was between 2 and 2.30 a.m. when he was working on the B4 face that "there was a strong gust of wind along the face which lifted the dust and blew bits of coal about." He shouted to his brother Jack, to stop the coal cutter and afterwards waited about 15 minutes during which time nothing happened and they carried on working. At about 3.45 a.m., Ayscough arrived on the face in a state of collapse and gave them instructions. Winder said that on his way up the plane he found that the two inbye pumps had been started and they were delivering water into the standage there. |