P5-Knockshinnoch

KNOCKSHINNOCH CASTLE
New Cumnock, Ayrshire.
7th September 1950.

The Inquiry

The report on the causes and circumstances attending the accident which occurred at Knockshinnoch Castle Collier, Ayrshire on the 7th September 1950 was conducted by Sir Andrew Bryan, J.P., F.R.S.E., at the Ayr Council Chamber of the County Buildings from the 7th to the 10 th November and from the 13th to the 16th November 1950.

The final report was presented to The Right Honourable Philip Noel Baker, M.P., Minister of Fuel and Power on the 2nd March 1951. All interested parties were represented and the inquiry came to the following conclusions:-

1). The disaster was due to an inrush of peat which broke through from the surface into the face of the No.5 Heading in the South Boig District from the Main Coal Seam on the night of the 7th September 1950.

2). The No.5 Heading had been driven up towards the surface and had holed through on a deposit of boulder clay, sand and gravel at or near the base of a hollow of channel which had been eroded along the softer parts of the coal bearing rocks.

3). This hollow had a maximum depth of about 44 feet, was lined with a bed of boulder sand and gravel, above which was a layer of almost impervious mud overlain by a deposit of peat which extended to the surface.

4). The maximum depth of the peat deposit was about 12 feet, of which the top layer, about 2 feet thick, was consolidated above the level of the field drains, the remainder being water logged and in a fluid condition.

5). The No.5 Heading holed through when a shot was fired in the breast coal at the face of the heading on the night of 30th August and released a flow of water draining from the surface through the bed of boulder sand and gravel.

6). This flow of water remained almost constant until the morning of the disaster when, owing to an extraordinary heavy rainfall, the flow trebled with the result that it washed away debris under the base of the two hardwood pillars which had been built to give extra support to the props, causing it to collapse. A fall of roof resulted and rapidly extended and so weakened the thin supporting barrier of rock and coal at the face of the heading and next to the base and side of the hollow, that it finally collapsed. The bed of boulder sand and gravel gave way, then the layer of mud, and the peat flowed into the heading.

7). The peat continued to flow for some time and soon filled up miles of the underground roadways and blocked all means of exit from the underground workings to the surface, resulting in the loss of 13 lives and the trapping of 116 other workmen.

8). Although the position of the deposit of peat was shown on the geological survey map of the district and this map had been consulted in the planning department, the symbol indicating the presence of peat in the field concerned in this disaster was overlooked.

9). The field concerned had been visited on several occasions by officials, but they were misled as to the true nature and character of the ground by it’s superficial appearance due to limited effect of the field drainage system.

10). A proper examination of the nature and character of the ground in the field was not made by colliery management nor by the planning engineers at any time either before No.5 Heading approached the surface or after the heading had reached the outcrop beneath the superficial surface deposits.

11). In my opinion the subject to questions of legal interpretation, there was a contravention of Regulation 29 of the General Regulations, 1920 (Working under Moss, etc -Precautions) in that the No.5 Heading had been worked under a deposit of peat with a depth of cover of less than 60 feet or ten times the thickness of the seam, without taking precautions required by the Regulation.

12). There was a weakness in organization in that insufficient arrangements were made to ensure that the planning engineers were kept adequately informed of the subsequent changes disclosed by the progress of the workings in the No. 5 Heading Section to enable them to check the accuracy of the forecasts in the development plan, made in April 1950, for the district of the mine.

13). In my opinion and subject to the questions of legal interpretation, there was no contravention of Section 67 or of Section 68 of the Coal Mines Act, 1911.”

As a result of the Inquiry Sir Andrew Bryan made the following recommendations -

1). a copy of any map and of any relevant memoir published by the Geological Survey and relating to the district in which the mine is situated should be kept in the office of the manager of the mine and also in the offices of the surveying and planning departments relation to that mine.

2).Where the geological map or any boring, mining geological or other record shows the presence of peat or any unconsolidated deposit within, or in the proximity to, the boundaries of the mine, the limits and nature of such deposits should be shown on the working plan of the mine, and the General Regulations, 1920, No. 1423 (Workings under Moss etc. - Precautions) should apply to all working under areas so defined.

3). Before any working approaches within 600 feet of the surface until the nature of the intervening ground between the surface where the nature of the intervening ground between the surface and the expected horizon of the working had not been determined, the manager should obtain the advice of a competent field geologist as to the nature of the intervening ground and should consider such advice in determining which precautions, if any, are necessary before further working is undertaken.

4). No working should approach within 150 feet of the surface until the nature of the intervening ground between the surface and the expected horizon of the proposed working had been determined by boring or other approved means.

5). Except with the permission of the inspector and subject to conditions as he may think fit to impose, any working which is being driven towards the surface or a superficial deposit and had approached within 50 yards of the surface of the base of the deposit should not exceed 10 feet in width.

6). Research should be started to explore the possibilities of a rapid and accurate geophysical or other method of surveying to determine the thickness, nature and extent of all unconsolidated superficial deposits.

7). The provision of some form of simple, light-weight, self-contained breathing apparatus which could be worn by any workman after minimum instruction should be investigated without delay and, when such apparatus is available, arrangements should be made to maintain supplies at all General Rescue Stations or other suitable centres in every mining district.

8). Where practicable, the provision of an ‘escape’ roadway giving direct access to an adjacent mine should be considered.

9). Consideration should be given to the provision of a type of telephone cable for underground use in the mines which will be highly resistant to damage from inrush, inundation and fire.

10.). A suggestions I made in my Final Report on the Explosion at Whitehaven ‘William Colliery’, (Cmd.7410) namely that consideration should be given to the desirability of providing temporary erections such as tents or prefabricated structures to cope with the accommodation necessary for large numbers of persons employed in rescue and recovery operations at the time of a disaster, should be acted upon.

11). In the National Coal Board organization the status and responsibility of all Planning Engineers, Planners and Surveyors at all levels should be clearly defined in relation to those of Colliery Agent and Managers.”

Sir Andrew concluded the report with an expression of thanks to every one who had taken part in the rescue operations and the inquiry.

The George Medal was awarded to Houston and Park for their conduct during the events following the disaster. When salvage squads eventually were able to enter the pit they found evidence that the missing men had survived the original fall. On a bait tin which had been left by one of Houston’s party, and he had left unopened, a salvage worker found someone had opened it and not a crumb of the contents remained. Later messages were discovered on a conveyor belt signed by Dalziel and Howatt. The message was dated 12 th September, three days after the main party’s escape. It was timed at 6.10 p.m. and it informed the readers- "Still trying. We intend to make for No.21 Road" but every exit had been blocked and the mine became their tomb.

Those Who Died