Bentinck Colliery
The men who died were:-
- Willlie Sysan aged 18 years
- William Bacon aged 40 years who left a widow and seven children
- Harold Brown aged 14 years
- Ferdinand Wright aged 45 years who left six children
- Percy Staton aged 32 years who left a widow and four children
- Amos Allen aged 32 years who left a widow and a child
- George Simpson
- Willis King aged 25 year
- John C. Fletcher aged 39 years.
The injured were:-
- W. Bacon aged 60 years who had a broken leg and head injuries
- C. Baron who was seriously injured and taken to hospital.
Five others were sent home:-
- James Smith
- E. Ainger aged 32 years
- Robert Walker aged 24 years
- Harold Shelton aged 28 years
- Charles Simpson aged 37 years
The inquest was held by Mr. D. Whittingham, H.M. Coroner. Percy Francis Day, the manager of the mine for the last three and half years, said that he was not aware of any difficulty in the winding apparatus up to the day of the accident but two years before a tub had caught the side and dislocated the gear.
The competent persons appointed by the manager under Section 66 of the Coal Mines Act to make statutory inspections of the guides and shafts were the enginewright and three assistants whose work was to be supervised. The daily and weekly reports were signed by his three assistants and countersigned by him.
According to the enginewright's evidence, the daily examination of the conductors was not altogether done during the hour stated in those reports and therefore they were incorrect so far as the times were concerned, but the inspection was made daily, except so far as a 6 feet length of the conductors below the Low Main inset was concerned. It also transpired that when any screwing up of the conductors or such matter as changing the brasses in the slipper brackets on cages was found necessary during inspection, such operations were not mentioned in the daily report books.
The Inspector pointed out to the witness in Court that the section referred to required 'the result of the examination' to be recorded, and if this was not done the reports of the condition were unreliable. Both manager and enginewright acknowledged having misread this requirements of the Act, and stated that the adjustments or changes were first done and the reports signed to show that everything was safe.
Following the accident Mr. Mottram, the Inspector,
made the following recommendations to the management:-
- Than an additional guide be provided to each cage.
- That isolating guides be installed to prevent the cages colliding again.
- The substitution of weights to give adequate tension in the guides
- The adoption of sliding gates of the cages in place of whose swinging outwards.
Mr. Mottram went on to say:-
"After several inspections and many inquiries it cannot be definitely stated what was the real cause of the oscillation and consequent cause of the collision of the cages. There was no clear evidence of anything having fallen down the shaft to obstruct the cages nor was there any evidence of the cages having caught the side of the shaft. It was suggested by the manager that one of the gates on the ascending cage might have opened while the cage was running, by acting as a lever against the side of the shaft; it thrust the cage under the descending one at the meeting place. Certain vertical marks opposite one end of the cage and running in a straight line on the shaft wall were used as an argument in support of this theory. Such an assumption was not unreasonable, but the marks referred to were not in my view, conclusive, as parts of the cages, including pieces of sheet iron, fell down the shaft when the collision occurred, and the marks referred to may have been due to that cause alone.
It was suggested that as the conductor thimbles brasses on the cages were worn and not in a thorough state of repair there must have been accordingly considerable 'play' on the guide ropes. The worn condition of the brasses would not account for much more than half an inch of play an the accident could not be attributed to this. The thimbles were, however, held by steel brackets on the cage hoops, and if one or more of these broke loose on the ascending cage, especially a corner one, before the impact, it was probably the cause of the accident. Three of these brackets were missing but it was impossible to determine whether or not any of these had broken loose and caused the collision, but the slackness of the guides as discovered after the disaster did suggest that the oscillation of the cages had been caused by insufficient tension on the guides.'
The jury's verdict was that:-
'The deceased were accidentally killed by reason of the two cages coming into violent contact owing to oscillation of the cages or the guide ropes whilst descending No.2 shaft at the Bentinck colliery and the jury regretted that the miners had not taken advantage of the Mines Act. They recommended that a better method of recording the examinations should be adopted.'
With reference to the expressed regrets of the jury that miners had not taken advantage of the Mines Act, the Coroner mentioned rumours he had heard of previous rubbing of the cages and the miners' representatives also frequently referred to the same matter in Court.
Mr. Mottram commented:-
"The jury did not attach blame to anyone for the accident but it was evident from the statements of the colliery officials that the daily reports on the condition of the shaft fittings did not always accurately state either the correct time or the result of the examination, and some doubt was expressed as to whether the time, said to have been half an hour daily, was sufficient to enable a thorough examination to be made, though there was no evidence to show that the shaft was used for winding men before discovered defects were remedied. It transpired that the guides and clamps below the Low Main mouthing were not examined daily, but that the examination commenced at the surface and terminated at the inset. This was not as it should have been, and in all winding shafts ready means of access should be provided below the inset so that the daily inspection of the shaft guides can be thoroughly made.
I fear that in wet shafts this is not always done and that in some cases the water is allowed to rise in the sump to such a level as to render it impossible for the competent person to carry out entirely the examination of the guides and appliances in accordance with Section 66 of the Coal Mines Act, 1911.'
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